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The President’s Role in the Administrative
State: Rejecting the Illusion of “Political
Accountability”
by KEVIN BOHM*

Introduction
Near constant attention is focused on President Donald J. Trump—
errant tweets routinely enflame debate over the actions of his
administration.1 The President’s blustering language may endear him to his
devotees, but his behavior often draws wider scrutiny. Even the nature of
his tweets and his blocking of followers on Twitter is litigated.2 Though the
President would likely disagree, a high level of scrutiny is not unique to the
Trump presidency. Each administration has had its critics and drawn the ire
of their political opponents.3 But even in the midst of spotlight and scandal,
the government must govern—or at least attempt to do so—as political
hyper-polarization and gridlock threaten to derail its operations. In times of
political gridlock, administrative agencies must continue to function and
keep the government operating. But, amidst the gridlock, may the President
bypass the legislative process and direct agencies to take specific actions?
And if so, what would justify such unilateral decision making?
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* University of California, Hastings College of the Law J.D. Candidate 2019. I am greatly
indebted to Professor Reuel Schiller for his encouragement and guidance.
1. See Maggie Haberman, Glenn Thrush, and Peter Baker, Inside Trump’s Hour-By-Hour
Battle for Self-Preservation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/us/
politics/donald-trump-President.html; Andrew Buncombe, Donald Trump one year on: How the
Twitter-President changed social media and the country’s top office, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17,
2018), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/the-twitter-President-howpotus-changed-social-media-and-the-presidency-a8164161.html.
2. John Herrman & Charlie Savage, Trump’s Blocking of Twitter Users Is Unconstitutional,
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/business/media/
trump-twitter-block.html.
3. See Alicia Parlapiano & Wilson Andrews, Limits on Presidents Acting Alone, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/20/us/politics/Presidental-executi
ve-action.html.
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4. See infra note 10.
5. See infra note 73.
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
7. See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The NotSo-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967 (2001).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9. JERRY L. MASHAW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 302 n.2 (5th ed. 2003).
10. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President:
An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
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For some time, direct presidential control of administrative agencies has
been the subject of debate among academics.4 As the discussion of the
president’s authority to direct specific actions has evolved over time, the
justification citing to the chief executive’s “political accountability” to the
broad American electorate most notably came to center stage in Elena
Kagan’s 2001 article entitled Presidential Administration.5 As discussed
below, the ability of a President to specifically direct administrative agencies
is in tension with the foundational American principle of separation of
powers. Furthermore, the notion of political accountability is at best a
precarious attempt to balance normative expectations of what a President
ought to do with what Congress intended his role to be.
Article II of the United States Constitution gives the executive branch
the authority and power necessary to carry out and enforce the law, vesting
“[t]he executive Power . . .” and obligates the President to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”6 The skeletal nature of the Constitution
means that it merely outlines the scope of presidential power in broad
strokes.7This vagueness leaves much room for debate and political punditry
with respect to the President’s obligations and limits.
The Constitution gives a smidge of specificity with respect to
administrative agencies in Article II, Section 2: “[t]he President . . . may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices . . .”8 There is no doubt that a President sets the policy for
his administration, and may oversee agency operations, but what is the extent
of his interference with an agency’s functions? Is the President entitled to
specifically dictate an agency action absent clear constitutional or statutory
authority?
There is a mountain of commentary about presidential power and the
Debates of
President’s relationship with the administrative state.9
constitutional authority and concerns over the delicate separation of powers
permeate the academic discussion of the presidency.10 Numerous theories
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L. REV. 573, 649 (1984) (explaining that Congress can delegate decision making authority to the
agency rather than the President) [hereinafter Strauss 1984]; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or the
Decider? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (the President
has no decision making authority with respect to an agency unless congress explicitly gives him a
role) [hereinafter Strauss 2007].
11. Id.
12. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE AGE OF FRACTURE 8–9 (2011).
13. Elena Kagan, Presidential Authority, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
14. Presidential Administration was cited 371 times in its first year alone. Fred R. Shapiro
& Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1495 (2012).
15. Kagan, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. See id.
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of “presidential control” have attempted to develop a constitutional
justification for the chief executive’s ever-growing entanglement with the
administrative state, and to defend the current administrative organization as
being consistent with the intent of our government’s structure.11 Tracking
this debate provides an opportunity to survey the conversation among
prominent academics; and in doing so, it is useful to recognize that this
debate does not take place in a vacuum. As in any discipline, legal
discussions are subject to the influence of broader societal changes, the
crossing-over of ideas from other disciplines, and public sentiment at large.12
Placing presidential control theories and critiques in the context of their
intellectual and historical background may add a useful lens through which
to view and understand them and help articulate the spirit of the time.
The discussion sparked by Supreme Court Justice, and former Solicitor
General Elena Kagan’s indisputably influential article, Presidential
Authority, led to numerous critiques.13 Kagan’s prominence, and the fact
that her article is widely cited, makes her work an excellent choice to focus
on.14 In her article, Kagan analyzed President Bill Clinton’s use of directive
authority to guide agency actions that furthered his policy agendas.15 After
describing the history and development of presidential oversight of
administrative agencies during the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton years, Kagan
argues that the increased use of executive authority for agency oversight and
intervention is permissible, beneficial, and desirable.16 Though she does not
embrace a unitarian view of executive power, Kagan nonetheless defends a
President’s ability to assert control and direct the administrative state by
relying on the doctrines of statutory interpretation and a normative “political
accountability” argument.17
This note begins with relevant highlights from constitutional and
administrative law pertaining to the subject of presidential control followed
by an overview of the main aspects of Kagan’s theory to orient the
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discussion. Specifically, the focus will be on the development of the
presidential administration theory, a selection of prominent critiques to form
observations of Kagan’s work, and the larger presidential control framework.
Though legal theories are often portrayed as dispassionate and purely
analytical, they are not insulated from broader external influences, and
broader social trends may be influencing legal thought on an aspect of
presidential power.18 Finally, the political backdrop during the emergence
of presidential control theories in the Reagan era is contrasted with the more
recent period; culminating with an argument rejecting “political
accountability” as a justification for presidential directives in the face of
political and institutional gridlock.

I. Constitutional Structure of the Administrative State

10/23/2018 13:43:40

18. See RODGERS, supra note 12.
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 69 (3rd
ed. 2016).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
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Distrust of a powerful unified government is at the core of the American
creation story. Think back to stories from elementary school history and the
heroic depictions of the American revolutionaries fighting back against a
despotic English monarch. James Madison wrote in the Federalist Paper
that, “[i]f angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary.”19 To allay fears of a strong national
government the framers devised our tripartite structure designed to separate
and distribute powers, creating incentives for each branch to “[keep] each
other in their proper places.”20
Our government derives all authority from a Constitutional granted by
the people.21 “We the People—remember the Preamble—have granted
limited and enumerated powers to the three branches of the federal
government.”22 The first three articles of the Constitution outline the basic
structure and power of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
The text of the respective vesting clauses varies and, in keeping with
the Constitution as a whole, are vague, but “[w]ill it be sufficient to mark,
with precision, the boundaries of these [branches], in the constitution of the
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching
spirit of power?”23 The blending of powers necessary to form administrative
agencies challenge the strict formalist adherence to the idea of separation of
powers, and potentially breaks down the adversarial nature that was meant
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to keep governmental institutions in check. Centralized power, and singleminded governance seems to have been what the framers sought to prevent.
James Madison warned, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands False . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”24
Given their revolutionary heritage, the framers were fearful of an
overbearing central power and sought to create a government of divided
powers to prevent the tyrannies of the recently displaced English Crown.25
Whether the existence of the modern administrative state should raise this
same sort of concern is still up for debate.26 “Controlling and checking
administrative agencies poses an important constitutional problem,
unaddressed by the text or the framers’ intent.”27 We are left to ask: where
exactly is decision making authority vested when Congress creates an
executive agency, and to what extend may the President control his own
people?28

II. Administrative Law: Separation of Powers Operationalized
Administrative agencies have existed since George Washington’s
presidency.29 However, the modern administrative state looks dramatically
different from the government as it existed in the founding era. In 1802,
there were 2,597 employees of executive agencies, by 1997 the number had
grown to 1,872,000.30 According to the most recent report from 2017, the
number stands at 2,087,747 federal employees working in executive
agencies.31 As the administrative state has grown in size, scope, and
complexity, the balance of power in the government has decidedly shifted
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 106 Side A
10/23/2018 13:43:40

24. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 342 (5th ed. 2017), quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
25. Richard R. Beeman, The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Revolution in
Government, NAT’L. CONSTITUTION CR., (last visited Apr. 15, 2018), https://constitutioncenter
.org/interactive-constitution/white-pages/the-constitutional-convention-of-1787-a-revolution-in
government.
26. The modern administrative state has, to a large extent, evolved out of necessity as the
government requires technical expertise and adequate staff to administer the law and programs
Congress has created.
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24.
28. See, e.g., supra note 10.
29. Congress created the Department of Foreign Affairs, which would later be renamed the
State Department in July 1789. See Percival, supra note 7, at 973 n.49.
30. Id. at 975 (citing Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633, 691 (2000)).
31. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., SIZING UP THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FISCAL YEAR 2017
(2018).
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32. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001).
33. Percival, supra note 7, at 967; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 355–56.
34. Congress delegates functions of all three branches to agencies, but my focus will be on
theories of the relationship between the President and administrative agencies with respect to the
actual operation of the agency.
35. Magill, supra note 32, at 607.
36. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2251.
37. Magill, supra note 32, at 608.
38. Id.
39. Reflecting a strict textual and structural interpretation.
40. Magill, supra note 32, at 609.
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towards the executive branch.32 However, this accumulation of power in a
branch of government run by a single person may not be a desirable
phenomenon.
Agencies, being creatures of statute, are delegated their authority by
Congress.33 The creation of an agency is a legislative exercise, while the
actual operation is an executive function.34 Once created, the agency is
handed to the President for him to administer. This arrangement between
Congress and the President creates issues of power sharing. There is
disagreement about whether the principle of separation of powers even
allows for allocation of authority from one branch to another, and if so, what
would be substantively required?35 However, it is interesting to note that this
separation of powers question is a problem created by Congress itself.
Precisely because administrative agencies are creatures of statute, Congress
could resolve issues of presidential control if it would be more explicit about
the design and structural intent of administrative agencies and how they are
to operate. As will be discussed later, Kagan herself states that she “accepts
Congress’s broad power to insulate administrative activity from the
president.”36 Congress need only weigh in on the matter. However, that
would necessitate taking a stance on an issue—something unlikely to
happen.
Taking the uncertainty of the Constitution as a given, there are a few
tools that can be used to analyze constitutional issues. With respect to
separation of powers inquiries, the two main analytical flavors come in the
form of formalist or functionalist inquiry.37 The formalist approach
emphasizes the explicit power vested by the Constitution in the three
branches of government.38 For formalists, the structure of the Constitution
itself demands that power be kept separate.39 The question is if power “is
exercised by the appropriate department in the appropriate way.”40 This
offers a simple front-end check on administrative agency power by looking
to the source of authority rather than a more uncertain inquiry into the action
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itself. For example, Congress may enact laws and implement policy
decisions via the legislative process, then hand them over to the President to
execute. However, Congress may not delegate its own legislative functions
over to the executive branch. Under a formalistic approach, delegations are
permissible as long as they do not blur the boundaries between branches as
created by the Constitution.

A. The Formalist Approach

10/23/2018 13:43:40

41. The nondelegation doctrine is based on a textualist interpretation of the vesting clauses
(the clauses say nothing about the ability to delegate power to other branches), as well as a strict
structuralist interpretation of the three separate branches of government.
42. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (upholding the delegation of power
to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines to an independent Sentencing Commission).
43. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
45. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–76 (2001).
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The influence of the formalist approach seemed to be at its height in the
1930’s when the Supreme Court struck down two statutes on the grounds
that they violated the nondelegation doctrine.41 “The nondelegation doctrine
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
government.”42 The only two cases where the Supreme Court struck down
congressional delegations of power as impermissible are Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, and A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, both in
1935. The delegations in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry were
invalidated because the delegation purportedly granted the President
legislative power without clear guidelines, or an adequate “intelligible
principle.”43 Therefore, a presidential directive to an administrative agency
absent a clear intelligible principle would not be permissible. Almost two
decades later, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Black
concluded that a presidential directive, absent clear congressional delegation
of authority, violated the framers’ decision to “[entrust] the lawmaking
power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”44 Justice Black’s
statement is in keeping with later arguments that a President should not have
unilateral authority in all realms, showing that concerns of executive
overreach are nothing new.
For formalists, the intelligible principle is a way for Congress to
accomplish a constitutional transubstantiation of sorts, whereby the scope of
executive delegation is limited even if not precisely defined by the express
terms of the statute.45 “When the issue is delegation by Congress to the
executive branch, the Supreme Court follows a standard it articulated in
1928—that there must be an ‘intelligible principle’ in the legislation to guide
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the discretion of the government officials who are to implement the law.”46
The mere presence of an intelligible principle in the statutory delegation has
the power to transform legislative power into executive power by sufficiently
cabining the executive branch’s discretion.
In an effort to maintain the separation of powers, the Court requires
Congress to provide an intelligible principle to guide agency action with
determinate criteria.47 While the Court invalidated the two challenges to
statutes from the Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry cases discussed
above, it has not invalidated a statute for lacking an adequate intelligible
principle since.48 The “[nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and
211 bad ones (and counting).”49
In modern jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has broadly
accommodated congressional delegations to the administrative state as a
practical necessity “of our increasingly complex society.”50 Though the
nondelegation principle has largely gone by the wayside, the formal
requirements of the intelligible principle live on in modern separation of
powers jurisprudence; however, the structural constraint lacks the bite it once
had.

B. The Functionalist Approach
On the other hand, the functionalist approach accepts that the branches
of government will have overlapping powers and responsibilities. Instead of
the more formal textual and structural inquiry, the functional inquiry is if the
overall balance between the branches has been upset by a particular
delegation.51 This balancing test was articulated in Justice Jackson’s
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 107 Side B
10/23/2018 13:43:40

46. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students: Non-delegation doctrine returns after long
hiatus, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-forlaw-students-non-delegation-doctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus/.
47. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457 (holding that the EPA’s mandate under the Clean Air Act
to set levels “requisite to protect human health” was sufficient to cabin agency discretion).
48. Though there have been attempts to revive the nondelegation doctrine over the years, the
Supreme Court recently announced that it will hear another nondelegation challenge in the
upcoming Gundy v. United States case (asking whether Congress improperly delegated authority
to the Attorney General in the context determinations under the Sex Offender Notification and
Registration Act); see Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court May Revive a Legal Theory Last
Used to Strike Down New Deal Laws, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2018, 12:26 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2018/03/supreme-court-may-revive-non-delegation-doctrine-in-gundy-v-unitedstates.html; Amy Howe, Justices grant review in two new cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2018,
11:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/03/justices-grant-review-two-new-cases/.
49. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
50. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
51. See Magill, supra note 32.
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concurrence in Youngstown where he acknowledged the inevitable blurring
of powers:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government.52
Modern functionalists accept the delegation of legislative power to the
executive as long as the delegation is somehow limited by statute. Justices
Stevens and Souter articulated this position in their concurring opinion in
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations:

For Justices Stevens and Souter “[a]s long as the delegation provides
a sufficiently intelligible principle, there is nothing inherently
unconstitutional about it.”54
Either through the flexible interpretation of the functionalists, or by the
strict logic of the formalists, the Supreme Court permits Congress to delegate
a considerable amount of discretion and authority to administrative agencies.
However, given the President’s domination in the administrative arena,
broad delegations to agencies have resulted in the accumulation of vast

10/23/2018 13:43:40

52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
53. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., and Souter, J.,
concurring).
54. Id. at 490.
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The Court has two choices. We could choose to articulate our
ultimate disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that
the power delegated to the EPA is “legislative” but nevertheless
conclude that the delegation is constitutional because adequately
limited by the terms of the authorizing statute. Alternatively, we
could pretend, as the Court does, that the authority delegated to
the EPA is somehow not “legislative power.” Despite the fact that
there is language in our opinions that supports the Court’s
articulation of our holding, I am persuaded that it would be both
wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in
delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is
“legislative power.”53
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power in the executive branch.55 The modern separation of powers
battleground has shifted from scrutinizing the delegation itself to the rights
and responsibilities of the President.56
As the validity of delegations themselves has been largely accepted, the
inquiry then shifts to that of identifying to whom statutory discretion is in
fact delegated. The text of the statutes themselves often vest authority in the
administrator of the agency.57 Yet Unitary Executive Theorists58 would
argue that the President is obligated to intervene with governance by such
appointees as a matter of constitutional mandate.59 Under the Unitary view,
the President may, and should, commandeer the operations of an agency.
However, direct presidential decision making in the realm of the agency
raises issues of statutory construction and separation of powers concerns.
“[The] separation of powers reflects a conscious effort to diffuse authority
to prevent abuses of power.”60“Inherent in this division of power is the notion
that the President must respect statutory commands even when they require
a result contrary to his own policy preferences.”61 The discussion that
follows focuses on the President himself and his ability to direct and supplant
agency decisions. This raises legal questions of whether that directive power
is permitted, and the separate normative question of whether centralized
decision making is even desirable. And even if unilateral presidential control
is indeed desirable—a dubious contention—should the simplistic notion of
“political accountability” be worthy of our faith as the bedrock of
presidential checks and balances in the administrative arena? Can it serve as
a meaningful check on presidential whims to assuage concerns of arbitrary
action?
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 108 Side B
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55. See Magill, supra note 32.
56. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–85 (2003); Lisa S. Bressman & Michael
P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A critical look at the practice of Presidential
control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52–56 (2006); Blumstein, supra note 10; Kevin M. Stack, The
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006).
57. The administrator of the agency (or board as may be the case with some agencies) is often
explicitly named as the person to whom Congress has delegated discretion when implementing the
law.
58. Unitary Executive Theory suggests the answer to this question is a matter of constitutional
interpretation. If the President has been delegated “the Executive Power” by the Constitution, then
he may—and is in fact obliged to—take charge of everything happening under his authority in the
executive branch.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
60. Percival, supra note 7, at 969.
61. Id.
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III. Presidential Control of the Administrative State
Elena Kagan’s Presidential Administration was the most widely cited
law review article of 2001.62 At the time, Kagan’s theory was the latest
iteration in a line of presidential control theories used to justify the
administrative state.63 Presidential Administration is an important work to
examine, given Kagan’s prominence in the legal field. She is a legal
academic, and was a law professor at both the University of Chicago School
of Law and Harvard Law School.64 She served in the Clinton administration
as Associate Counsel to the President, then Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy.65 Kagan then returned to academia to serve as Dean of
Harvard Law School from 2003-2009 before returning to government when
President Obama nominated her as Solicitor General in 2009.66 Most
importantly, she took her seat on the United States Supreme Court as an
Associate Justice in 2010.67 This is a person whose thoughts on
constitutional issues matter a great deal. As a high-profile legal figure, her
opinions carry tremendous weight and are worthy of attention. It is no
wonder that her article is debated so frequently.
Many articles that discuss Presidential Administration recognize it as a
significant contribution to the development of the presidential control model.68
However, the vast majority of academic papers that cite to Presidential
Administration merely reference it in passing with a single footnote.69 Given
a sample of 105 journal articles which cite to Presidential Administration, only
15% address Kagan’s proposed theory with much detail.70 Yet even those

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 109 Side A
10/23/2018 13:43:40

62. Shapiro & Pearse, supra note 14, at 1495 (Presidential Administration with an estimated
371 citations in the first year after publication).
63. See Bressman, supra note 56 (Professor Bressman provides an overview of the
development of Presidential control models in Section I. Past models include: transmission belt,
expertise, and interest group representation models.).
64. Current Members of the United States Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (last visited Mar. 17, 2017, 12:23 PM), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biograph
ies.aspx.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Whether the authors agree or not with Kagan’s particular take on presidential control,
Presidential Authority is often regarded as a significant addition to the presidential control field.
69. In a sample of 105 articles that reference Kagan’s Presidential Administration (PA), 38
mentioned PA once, 36 mentioned PA two to five times, with only 16 mentioning PA in more than
ten footnotes. Articles were found using Westlaw. To keep the search manageable for this short
project, the search was focused on journals published by law schools ranked in the top 14 by U.S.
News & World Report, and student notes were removed.
70. Id., with “much detail” meaning that the article cited to Presidential Authority 10 or more
times.
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scholars tend to discuss presidential control theories in general rather than
the specific merits of Kagan’s propositions.71 In articles where the
discussion does center on the theory of presidential authority, the focus
seems to be on the implausibility of Kagan’s political accountability
argument.72 Meanwhile, Kagan’s more specific contribution of a statutory
interpretation justification does not seem to have gained much traction.73
Overall, her justifications seem to be challenged rather than embraced.74

IV. Traditional Presidential Control
Kagan embraces a strong view of presidential control over the executive
branch.75 This view is articulated in Presidential Authority, where she
describes a middle ground between the “traditional” view and the “unitary
executive theory.”76
According to the traditional view, Congress has the constitutional
authority to directly vest discretionary authority in the head of an agency.77
Following the traditional separation of powers approach and the current
method of statutory interpretation, the delegation to an agency head is
understood to preclude presidential directives:78
Basic separation of powers doctrine maintains that Congress must
authorize presidential exercises of essentially lawmaking
functions. In directing agency officials as to the use of their
delegated discretion, the President engages in such functions, but
without the requisite congressional authority. Congress indeed has

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 109 Side B
10/23/2018 13:43:40

71. Referring to the sample of articles mentioned supra note 69.
72. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 13.
73. See Percival, supra note 7 (arguing that Kagan’s statutory interpretation framework is
inconsistent with constitutional text, as well as congressional intent regarding administrative
agency structure); Blumstein, supra note 10 (dismissing structural arguments as being policy
arguments in camouflage); Bressman, supra, note 56 (political accountability is an insufficient
rationale for justifying presidential directive authority); Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006)
(Presidential agendas are too short-term oriented to provide sufficient incentives to justify political
accountability rationale for reaching the best long term interests—efficiency is not the same as
wisdom).
74. Of the articles in my sample, only one supported Kagan’s political accountability
argument; see Blumstein, supra note 10.
75. See Kagan, supra note 13.
76. Id.
77. Todd B. Tatelman, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan: Presidential Authority and the
Separation of Powers, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7 (Report No. R41272, June 4,
2010).
78. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2319–20.
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delegated discretionary power, but only to specified executive
branch officials; by assuming responsibility for this power, the
president thus exceeds the appropriate bounds of his office.79
Expressed another way, because “Congress has, by statute, specifically
vested the decision making authority in the agency head, the President cannot
‘go so far as to displace the agency head’s discretion to make decisions
vested in that officer by law.’”80 For traditionalists, the statutory delegations
seem to stand on the plain meaning of the text and precludes presidential
interference.
In contrast, unitary executive theorists assert that the Constitution vests
exclusive control of the executive branch in the hands of the President.81
Any attempt by Congress to limit the President’s control over the executive
branch is unconstitutional—particularly with respect to the creation of
independent agencies. In addition to a strict reading of the Constitution,
unitarians invoke a political accountability argument to further justify
unitary executive control by the President, as he is ultimately held
responsible for the collective action of the government.82 However, Kagan
explicitly rejects such a strong stance, and states that “the unitarians have
failed to establish their claim for plenary control as a matter of constitutional
mandate.”83 “The original meaning of Article II is insufficiently precise and,
in this area of staggering change, also insufficiently relevant to support the
unitarian position.”84

V. Kagan’s Presidential Administration

10/23/2018 13:43:40

79. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2319–20.
80. Tatelman, supra note 77.
81. Id., at 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the “take care” clause).
82. Id. at 9 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62
VAND. L. REV. 103, 116 (2009)).
83. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326.
84. Id.
85. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 56, at 52–56.
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As control of the administrative state has become more centralized over
time, various models of presidential control have emerged as an attempt to
justify this framework as consistent with the Constitution’s structural
separation of powers.85 It seems that Kagan uses the term “presidential
administration” to describe a middle ground between the traditional view
that is dominant in modern administrative law, and the minority Unitary
Executive understanding of presidential power. Her theory is primarily
based on observations of President Clinton’s practice while in office and his
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86. Kagan, supra note 13.
87. Id. at 2290–303.
88. Id. at 2253–69. The development and demise of the expertise and interest group control
models are discussed by Professor Bressman in her article; see Bressman, supra note 56, at 469–
78.
89. Id. at 2277–81.
90. Blumstein, supra note 10, at 853.
91. Id. at 854–55.
92. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
93. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2281–2319; Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735
(Sept. 30, 1993), (giving the president the power to resolve disputed between an agency and OIRA,
“[t]o the extent permitted by law”).
94. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2250.
95. Id.
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innovations on preexisting presidential control techniques.86 Those
innovations include re-tooling review by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—shifting from Reagan’s deregulatory agenda,
issuing directives, and publicly taking credit/responsibility for certain
agency action.87
Before sketching the framework of presidential administration, Kagan
gives a review of “non-presidential” mechanisms of administrative control,
which includes: congressional control of delegations, self-control (similar to
agency expertise justifications), interest group control, and judicial control.88
Since the tools underlying presidential administration did not originate in the
Clinton Administration, Kagan also reviewed the origins of centralized
executive review of agency rulemaking by OIRA, which was established by
President Ronald Reagan’s innovative use of
President Reagan.89
presidential power transformed the chief executive’s relationship with the
administrative state, setting the tone for his successors in office.90 “From
controversial fringe to mainstream in twenty years, centralized presidential
regulatory review has now taken center stage as an institutionalized part of
the modern American presidency.”91
However, Kagan’s theory presented in Presidential Administration is
based on President Clinton’s unique brand of presidential control. Kagan
recognizes that President Clinton built on President Reagan’s novel
regulatory review process92 by expanding presidential authority over
administrative agencies, and in some circumstances even claiming the power
to direct outcomes.93 But, one of the key features that distinguished
Clinton’s practice of presidential control was his “articulation and use of
directive authority over regulatory agencies.”94 Kagan defined “directive
authority” as the President’s “commands to executive branch officials to take
specified actions within their statutorily delegated discretion.”95 The second
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component of this new form of presidential control was Clinton’s “assertion
of personal ownership over regulatory product.”96 This presidential
ownership of agency action was achieved by personal announcement and
appropriation of regulatory decisions and actions at public appearances by
the President to “promote himself and his policies.”97 Importantly, these
enhancements on the more traditional behind-the-scenes approach to
regulatory oversight are what give presidential administrations a claim to
greater transparency. “[President Clinton thus] emerged in public, and to the
public, as the wielder of “executive authority” and, in that capacity, the
source of regulatory action.”98 This more transparent aspect of presidential
administration, as compared to prior theories of presidential control, lays the
“political accountability” underpinnings for Kagan’s take on statutory
interpretation. However, as seen below, this argument is lacking in regard
to persuasive power because it is an oversimplification of the process, and
glosses over the fact that the President can simply hide or distance himself
from less popular actions.

VI. Statutory Interpretation

[M]y acceptance of congressional authority in this area does not
require the conclusion, assumed on the conventional view, that the
President lacks all power to direct administrative officials as to the

Kagan, supra note 13, at 2250.
Id. at 2299–300.
Id. at 2300.
Kagan, supra note 13, at 2320.
Id.
Id. at 2326.

10/23/2018 13:43:40

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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Kagan’s proposed shift from the traditional separation of powers
viewpoint to the one proposed in Presidential Administration hinges on
changing how Congressional delegations to administrative agencies are
interpreted.99 Under the traditional view of separation of powers, the specific
delegation of decision making authority to an agency head precludes
presidential intervention, unless explicitly provided for.100 Whereas,
Unitarians argue that the President has inherent authority over the
administrative officials that stem directly from the constitutional grant of
executive authority.
Although, unlike Unitarians, Kagan accepts
congressional primacy in the delegation arena.101 However, she argues that
recognizing congressional control does not necessarily mean that the
President lacks directive power:
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exercise of their delegated discretion. That Congress could bar the
President from directing discretionary action does not mean that
Congress has done so; whether it has is a matter of statutory
construction.102

10/23/2018 13:43:40

102. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 2320.
105. Id.
106. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2320
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2320–37; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 603 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
109. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2326–27.
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Kagan’s legal innovation is the creation of a middle ground between the
Traditional and Unitary views with her shift in statutory interpretation.103
Kagan “acknowledge[s] that Congress generally may grant discretion to
agency officials alone and that when Congress has done so, the President
must respect the limits of this delegation.”104 But as she points out,
congressional limitations precluding presidential influence are focused on
insulating independent agencies.105 In general, Kagan argues, the limitation
of delegated discretion should not apply to “regular” executive agencies.
The “statutory predicate” underlying the traditional separation of powers
view is but one of two constitutionally permissible interpretive methods.106
She suggests “that most statutes granting discretion to [the] executive
branch—but not independent—agency officials should be read as leaving
ultimate decision making authority in the hands of the President.”107 That is,
unless specifically excluded, the President should not be read out of
delegations of power.
Kagan addresses the constitutional concerns raised by her theory by
invoking key Supreme Court decisions that have commented on the scope of
presidential control, such as Youngstown and the removal line of cases (e.g.,
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Morrison).108 After distinguishing the
key cases and addressing legal hurdles, Kagan concludes that it is
permissible to “assume that the delegation runs to the agency official
specified, rather than to any other agency official, but still subject to the
ultimate control of the President.”109 When attempting to decipher
congressional intent, Kagan argues, it is permissible—and in her perspective,
desirable—to assume that “Congress knows . . . that executive officials stand
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110. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2327 (this conclusion is related to Kagan’s discussion of the
removal line of cases which have established the President’s authority to remove certain officers
without cause).
111. Id. at 2325–26 (the limitations of Presidential influence come from congress’ ability to
place removal restrictions).
112. Id. (emphasis added)
113. Id. at 2328.
114. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2255.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2254–61.
118. Id. at 2330.
119. Id. at 2327.
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in all other respects in a subordinate position to the President.”110 This
understanding is what led congress to impose statutory restrictions on
presidential involvement with independent agencies.111 However, statutes
should not be read to restrict presidential involvement in executive branch
agencies, unless explicitly stated. Her conclusion, that Congress may not
place removal restrictions on all administrative officers, is based on the
President’s right to procedural oversight and directive authority.112 “[W]hen
Congress delegates to an executive official, it in some necessary and obvious
sense also delegates to the President.”113
If taking the perspective that the branches are in competition, it may be
expected that Congress would guard its constitutional power to legislate and
make policy decisions.114 After all, executive agencies have no authority
other than that given to them by Congress. Ideally, this separation of powers
acts as a check on the administrative state. “To the extent that Congress
delegates specifically and clearly to administrative agencies, it performs this
control function effectively.”115 However, Congress has given away vast
amounts of policy making authority to administrative agencies through openended delegations.116 Congress has made the decision—whether made of
concern for efficiency, the desire for agency expertise, or perhaps to avoid
the political liability of decision making—to delegate broad powers to the
executive branch.117
Kagan argues that the assumption that Congress intended to retain
control of agencies, or insulate them from the President, “does not square
with many other aspects of Congress’s behavior.”118 Furthermore, the
existence of removal restrictions in independent agencies shows that
Congress knows how to prevent presidential interference when it wants to.
The fact that Congress did not restrict presidential influence on other
agencies can just as validly be assumed to infer acceptance of the practice.119
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“Congress knows, after all, that executive officials stand in all other respects
in a subordinate position to the President.”120
. . .Congress has reposed considerable, and ever-increasing,
authority in the [executive branch]. So too if the assumption [of
competition for power between the branches] were true, recent
assertions of presidential authority over all agencies, executive
and independent, would have met stiffer resistance from Congress
than they in fact encountered. For reasons earlier discussed,
Congress tends to defend its institutional interests poorly. There
seems little reason to presume that as to the single matter of
directive authority, Congress self-consciously has adopted such an
uncommonly self-protective posture.121

Kagan, supra note 13, at 2327.
Id. at 2330.
Id.
Kagan, supra note 13, at 2328.
Id.
Id. at 2330.
Id.

10/23/2018 13:43:40

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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Alternatively, Kagan recognizes that it is equally, if not more, likely
“that Congress generally has no intent on the matter” of presidential directive
authority.122
As stated previously, Congressional delegation of authority is a
choice—and perhaps this confusion and constitutional handwringing is in
large part the fault of Congress and its inability to express its intent clearly,
if at all. As Kagan suggests, absent a clear delegation to only the agency
head or restriction, a role for the President should not be read out of the
statutory delegation.123 Kagan also argues that the method of statutory
interpretation is also a choice.124 She ultimately suggests that a default
interpretive principle that leaves space for presidential control is not only
consistent with statutory delegation, but may more accurately reflect the
intent and understanding of Congress.125 Referencing the structure of the
administrative state itself, Kagan argues that if Congress intended to retain
greater control over policymaking, and preclude presidential interference,
independent agencies would be more common than executive agencies;
which is not the case.126 However, this discounts the fact that it is difficult
to divine congressional intent from what it has not done, and might be the
result of an overly simplistic reduction of the political process. Can the
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inaction, or political inability/unwillingness of Congress to act, really be
interpreted as a positive desire to hand such power to a rival branch?

VII. Political Accountability

10/23/2018 13:43:40

127. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2331.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2332.
131. Id. at 2335.
132. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2332.
133. Id. (“The advent of what has become known as the permanent Presidential campaign, a
development linked to fundamental changes in polling technology and mass media, at once
demonstrates and reinforces the President’s attention to the national electorate’s views and
interests.”).
134. Id. at 2339.
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For Kagan, two core issues are central to presidential control models;
(1) making the administration accountable to the public, and (2) making the
administration efficient or otherwise effective.127 These two goals are often
viewed to be in conflict with each other because increased efficiency is often
associated with increased delegation to unelected agency officials.128 Kagan
makes the case that presidential administration resolves this conflict by
consolidating ultimate agency leadership and decision making authority in a
single politically accountable agent—i.e., the President—enhancing both
transparency and efficiency.129
Kagan argues that enhancing the President’s role increases political
accountability, because it “establishes an electoral link between the public
and the bureaucracy,” where no such direct link existed before.130 This link
is desirable “because the President has a national constituency, [and] he is
likely to consider . . . the preferences of the general public, rather than
merely parochial interests.”131 “The Presidency’s unitary power structure,
its visibility, and its ‘personality’ all render the office peculiarly apt to
exercise power in ways that the public can identify and evaluate.”132 If
nothing else, this assumption of accountability to a broad national
constituency is consistent with the President’s selfish incentives for his
reelection and favorable legacy.133
“Because the public holds Presidents, and often Presidents alone,
responsible for so many aspects of governmental performance, Presidents
have a large stake in ensuring an administration that works, at least in the
eyes of the public.”134 Therefore, given a President who is responsive and
politically accountable to the electorate, his direct control of the
administrative state will not only enhance its functioning, but is in fact
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democratically desirable.135 From an institutional choice perspective, “the
President holds the comparative advantage” with respect to the oversight of
the administrative state compared to Congress.136
Kagan’s central argument is that it is permissible, and likely desirable,
to shift the default method of statutory interpretation because the President
is a politically accountable elected official.137 Her reframing of the statutory
interpretive lens does the “legal work” in Presidential Administration, while
“political accountability” provides the normative footing.
It is her reliance on the unique position of the presidency in relation to
the administrative state and the claimed benefits of political accountability
that provide the policy rationales used to defend her theory of presidential
control.138 Kagan shifted the conversation away from constitutional analysis
and statutory interpretation to a normative discussion of political
accountability—the critiques followed suit. The result seems to be that
Kagan’s statutory shift has gotten lost in the ether as the majority of
responses focus on the normative political accountability rationale.

VIII. The Response

10/23/2018 13:43:40

135. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2335–37.
136. See id. at 2336–37.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 2346–80 (Kagan uses the concept of political accountability to deflect concerns
of decreased congressional oversight (at 2347), the pushing out of agency experts (at 2352), the
displacement of constituency input (at 2358), non-delegation challenges (at 2364), and traditional
reliance on judicial review (at 2372)).
139. Sources include all documents that cite Kagan’s Presidential Authority from 2001–18 as
listed in the WestLaw, Lexis, and JSTOR databases. The sources were distributed as follows:
Cases, 11; Briefs, 25; Administrative Decisions, 6; Journal Articles, 841; “Other Legal”, 12; “Law
Adjacent” (Political Science articles), 10.
140. Student notes were also eliminated.
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At first blush, the academic response to Kagan’s Presidential
Administration looks extensive. An initial database search yielded 905
different sources that have cited Presidential Authority.139 There is no doubt
that her work is influential, but the substance of presidential authority is not
as widely debated as that initial number might suggest.
For the purposes of this note, attention was focused on a subset of
prominent articles written by the most influential academics in the
administrative law field. As a proxy for “prominent academic,” the sample
was limited to articles published by journals associated with law schools in
the top 16 of the U.S. News & World Reports.140 Articles with titles “clearly
unrelated” to presidential control, administrative agencies, statutory
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interpretation, or separation of powers were removed (e.g., statute or casespecific notes).141
Of the 105 articles in my subset between 2001 and 2018, Presidential
Authority was cited an average of 5.3 times, with 71% of articles citing it
five times or fewer; 37%, merely included a single passing reference. This
suggests that many articles were citing the article in recognition of its
popularity but did not in fact discuss Kagan’s propositions. To further
narrow the focus of review, the number of citations to Presidential
Administration, were used as a proxy for an article’s depth of analysis of
Kagan’s arguments. Removing articles with fewer than ten references left a
sample set of 16 articles for more in-depth review.142
Of the 16 articles reviewed, only one supported Kagan’s ultimate
conclusions for direct presidential control. However, the author did not adopt
Kagan’s statutory interpretation argument.143 The author instead, argued
from the Unitarian perspective, stating that “on the issue of centralized
presidential regulatory review—about its desirability, its legality, and the
methods of its implementation—it appears that we are all (or nearly all)
Unitarians now.”144
The main critiques of Presidential Administration come in three
categories which argue on: statutory interpretation grounds alone, a mix of
statutory and political accountability arguments, or by highlighting the faults
of the political accountability justification.

XI. Statutory Interpretation Critiques

10/23/2018 13:43:40

141. “Clearly unrelated” often included language indicating a very narrow topic, usually
discussions of a specific case or statute.
142. This process likely eliminated some excellent articles that are on point but, given the
nature of a student note, the criteria seemed to be an appropriate way to sufficiently limit the scope
of review.
143. See Blumstein, supra note 10, at 851.
144. Id. at 852.
145. See Strauss 2007, supra note 10.
146. Id. at 705.
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An example of the formalist-type critique of Presidential
Administration can be seen in Professor Strauss’s article Overseer, or “The
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law.145 In his article, Strauss
shows that the President’s constitutional role in the administrative state is
limited to that of overseer, unless Congress specifically outlines a decision
making role.146 His arguments are structural and textual in nature. He
explains how the Constitution delegates authority over the administrative
state to Congress—highlighting this Congressional preference by noting
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“other than the President and Vice President, no executive branch office
exists without legislation.”147 Professor Strauss’ views are consistent over
time. A quote from a 1997 article of his shows the same interpretive stance.
“Yet, as seen, the text of the Constitution settles no more than the President
is to be the overseer of executive government, and False . . . the contours and
extent of present-day government make a stronger reading unacceptably
hazardous to public health.”148

IX. Mixed Critiques

10/23/2018 13:43:40

147. Strauss 2007, supra note 10, at 722.
148. Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 985 (1997)
(emphasis in original).
149. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027 (2002).
150. Id. at 2153.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2152–56.
153. See id. at 2155–58.
154. Id. at 2152–53
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Examples of a “mixed critique” on both statutory and political
accountability grounds, include articles by professors Einer Elhauge and
Robert Percival. Professor Elhauge’s argument relies on court precedent and
judicial review of administrative actions.149 Kagan’s arguments for
enhanced presidential control and political accountability are most salient
during times of political gridlock—where presidential directives
dramatically increase government efficiency. However, Elhauge argues
against granting the President broad directive power, even in the gridlock
scenario.150 After all, the purpose of administrative law seems to be to ensure
predictability and confidence in the procedural aspects of decision making.
For Elhauge, the answer to the dilemma already exists within the Chevron
framework, specifically the “extraordinary case” exception.151 Elhauge
argues against Kagan’s political accountability justification and instead
promotes an “enactable political preferences” standard to be used by courts
in limited circumstances to maximize political satisfaction.152 This
essentially creates a sort of political reasonableness standard for the court.153
Elhauge further shows that the Supreme Court has specifically declined
to adopt the President’s political accountability as a justification for giving
deference with respect to agency action.154 Though not in the exact context
of Kagan’s use of political accountability, Elhauge seems to use the Court’s
rejection as weight for his institutional choice argument that courts are
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See Percival, supra note 7.
Id. at 967–69.
Id.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 968.
Percival, supra note 7, at 968–69.
See id. at 1008–10.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id. at 1011.
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155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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already well suited to handle administrative issues, even in times of political
gridlock.
On the other hand, Professor Percival addresses Kagan’s specific
arguments head on in Presidential Management of the Administrative State:
The Not-So-Unitary Executive.155 Percival takes a strong textualist view of
separation of powers, rejecting the President’s role in administrative decision
making.156 For Percival, the Constitution may grant the President the power
to appoint certain officials, but he rejects the contention that the removal line
of cases have any implication on the President’s ability to interfere with
agency decision making.157 The power to fire is not the power to substitute
discretion. Percival further builds his argument by stating that “the executive
departments are creatures, not of the Constitution directly, but of
Congressional statutes.”158 When Congress exercises its legislative authority
to create administrative agencies pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, it “suggests that the Framers envisioned that certain powers could be
vested directly in executive departments or officers.”159 At most, Percival
concedes that the President has “some supervisory authority over the heads
of executive agencies,” but is not vested with the power to direct agency
decisions.160
Percival also disagrees with the political accountability justification for
dictating agency decisions.161 In contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the
President is a transparent public figure, Percival argues that giving him
directive authority would likely obfuscate presidential interference, not
“[B]y allowing the President to
enhance process transparency.162
countermand agency decisions, accountability would be blurred because in
many cases the public would be unable to understand whether a decision was
the product of the agency’s expertise or a presidential directive.”163 Instead,
Percival argues that the President’s role is, and should be, limited to that of
an advisor as he “has no authority to dictate regulatory decisions entrusted
to [agencies] by law.”164
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X. Political Accountability Critiques
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Professors Lisa Schultz Bressman and Neal Katyal advance critiques
centered on the political accountability justification of presidential control.
Professor Bressman takes aim at political accountability in her introductory
line: “[t]his Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with
the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for
political accountability.”165 For Bressman, it is a mistake to focus on
accountability. Instead, she argues that the primary concern of administrative
law, and our entire constitutional system of checks and balance for that
matter, is aimed at preventing arbitrariness.166 Bressman turns Kagan’s
argument on its head by asserting that the constitutional goal of the
administrative state is not accountability but the minimization of arbitrary
administrative action—often achieved by preventing the President from
asserting control.167
Also, as a threshold matter, Bressman notes that the base assumptions
for presidential control models are overly simplistic. For her, the reality of
the executive branch is not captured by the various models: “. . . [S]cholars
may have underestimated the complexity of White House involvement.
Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”168 In addition to Bressman’s
ordering of constitutional priorities, she argues that Kagan’s theory cannot
work because “transparency alone is not enough to combat arbitrary
administrative decision making.”169 The validity of Kagan’s political
accountability justification rests on the assumption that the presidency’s
operations are transparent.170 However, as with Percival above, Bressman
argues that “the President has the incentive and ability to hide control.”171
Essentially, this selective transparency cannot satisfy the baseline
assumptions of Kagan’s theory, and therefore political accountability is an
insufficient justification for presidential control. However, even if Bressman
thought Kagan’s assumptions were accurate, the theory would still not
legitimize the administrative state in her eyes unless it protected against
arbitrary action.172 It is doubtful that a model which allows a single actor—
even one politically accountable to a national constituency—to unilaterally
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direct policy decisions would offer the procedural protections against
arbitrary decision making that Professor Bressman seeks.
Finally, Professor Katyal addresses the historical context in which
Kagan developed her theory as part of his critique. “Kagan was selfconsciously writing in an era of divided government . . . ,” and Katyal
questions whether the objectivity of someone writing from the “vantagepoint of an administration that wants to get things done is the proper one for
setting parameters in constitutional and administrative law.”173
Katyal also critiques a flaw in the political accountability justification,
namely that the President’s incentives do not necessarily align with the
national interest, but instead are short-term in nature and tend to seek instant
gratification.174 He argues that centralized power with the aim of increasing
efficiency may not be a good thing. “[T]here are values other than
efficiency, values celebrated by our Founders. Indeed, a starting point for
our government is the evil of government efficiency.”175 Professor Katyal
closes his section on Presidential Administration with a punchy quip. “In
the end, Kagan is surely right to point out that a President has a ‘stake’ in
building an efficient government, but efficiency is not the equivalent of
wisdom.”176

XI. The Oversimplification of Political Accountability
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One side will always be happy if given unilateral control. It is easy to
argue for greater efficiency and authority when your preferred political party
is in power. As Professor Katyal said, Kagan was writing from the “vantagepoint of an administration that wants to get things doneFalse”177 However,
the trick is to think about how much power you would be willing to give your
political adversaries when you are in the minority.
“When people are fearful, angry or confused . . . they are tempted to
give away freedoms to leaders promising order.”178 Political hyperbole is
ever present, however the substantive relationship of the President and the
administrative state, and the interplay of transparency, accountability, legal
interpretation, and politics should be the focus. And as with any political
debate, the same facts can yield very different results. The diversity of
perspectives seen in the discussion above are likely due to the politics of the
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particular academic and the policy goals they may wish to advance in their
work.
However, these critiques were not formed in an academic vacuum.
Aside from theoretical and doctrinal distinctions discussed by the authors,
there is an additional background layer that may offer some insight into the
various perspectives on presidential control. Theories of presidential control
evolve in imperfect ways. They are the result of a “make it work moment,”
incorporating various values and concepts in search of reaching legitimacy
in order to achieve “a critical mass of public acceptance for the
administrative state.”179
Professor Adrian Vermeule explains that “each theorist ends up
adopting a kind of roughly optimizing pluralism of values for the
administrative state—a pluralism in which expertise, political accountability,
and legalism all have some claims . . . in a way that aims to generate a critical
mass of public acceptance.”180 For Vermeule, the legitimacy of the
administrative state is a foregone conclusion; criticism, even those claiming
illegitimacy, have the effect of reinforcing and strengthening the its integrity:

Vermeule’s articulation that theoretical models adapt in search of
achieving public acceptance plays well with a brief commentary situating the
historical and social backgrounds of the development of Presidential
Authority. This commentary hopes to provide an explanation for the
surprising resistance Presidential Authority seems to have encountered.
In his book, Age of Fracture, Professor Daniel T. Rodgers, and
intellectual historian, characterized the last quarter century as the “age of
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It is a conceptual mistake to think that complaints about the
administrative state, even on constitutional grounds, are
necessarily sociological evidence of the illegitimacy of the
regime. Such arguments may also be conventional moves within
the regime, which vent steam and thereby actually have a
legitimating effect. If they result in more or less minor
adjustments of legal and institutional rules—a bit more Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) oversight here, a bit
less judicial deference there, and so on—that is a sign of the
fundamental health, adaptability, and social legitimacy of the
regime, not of crisis.181

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 117 Side A

10/23/2018 13:43:40

BOHM_MACROED FINAL 10.15.18 (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2018

10/16/2018 9:19 AM

THE PRESIDENT’S ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

217

RODGERS, supra note 12.
Id.
See RODGERS, supra note 12, at 80–81.
Id.
See Kagan, supra note 13, at 2333.
Id. at 2285–90.

10/23/2018 13:43:40

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 117 Side A

fracture.”182 During the age of fracture, no other figure loomed larger than
President Ronald Reagan.183 This certainly rings true in the presidential
control realm. Rodgers’s observations that the obsession with the free
market and the search for efficiency permeated society at large, along with a
range of disciplines—including the law.184 Notably, Rodgers showed how
the obsession with efficiency and the language of economics crept into the
everyday language and politics of the age.185
President Reagan was a successful advocate of modern presidential
control practices, and Rodgers’’ age of fracture coincides with the Reagan
era’s presidential administrative controls and deregulation. The rise of
presidential control was based on the promise of optimizing government
administration and promoting general efficiency—in line with the economic
zeitgeist of the Reagan era. Presidential control as practiced by Reagan
focused on confidential involvement behind the scenes, through OIRA, to
slow down the rulemaking process.186 Such concealment is antithetical to
Kagan’s modern transparency and political accountability justifications.
That, however, eventually morphed into the practice of presidential
administration under Clinton, with the President highlighting his role and
agenda, and issuing executive orders that explicitly claim the authority to
direct agency officers.187
By translating Kagan’s justifications for presidential administration into
the economic language dominant in the Reagan era: “transparency” and
“political responsiveness of the President” easily become recognizable as
“perfect information” and “market response” in the economic lexicon.
Professor Bressman’s heightened concern of “arbitrary action” tracks well
with “risk aversion” and economic anxiety. The language and practice of
presidential control models track well with the broader discourse of the
Reagan era, helping the consolidation of presidential power gain traction.
But, what about the relatively recent pushback against the justifications
used to legitimize presidential control, specifically with respect to the
discussion of Presidential Administration after 2001? Was there a
substantial break separating Rodgers’ “age of fracture” the Reagan era and
our new era of contested presidential power? The fact that only a single
article in the sample supported Kagan’s enhanced version of presidential
control may indicate a lack of complacency with centralized control. This
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could indicate that concern for efficiency has been overtaken by concerns for
arbitrary decisions. Perhaps Americans have become more skeptical of the
market dogma of absolute efficiency prominent in the Regan era in a period
marked by high inequality and the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression. Professor Katyal’s quip that “efficiency is not the equivalent of
wisdom” may be an accurate reflection of the times.188 Reliability,
predictability, and protection from arbitrary game-changes might just be the
new driving force. These desires weigh against the consolidation of unitary
power and shift the academic discussion back towards the protection of
dispersed/expert administrative authority sheltered by the separation of
powers doctrine.
From the articles reviewed, efficiency, transparency, political
accountability, and the concern for arbitrary action were in the forefront of
the critiques. As compared to the Reagan era, information flows more
readily now in the age of the 24-hour news cycle where communication is
viral and instantaneous. We no longer need to rely on a single overseer to
ensure government accountability when we are all watchdogs on Twitter. If
anything, the very real threat of obfuscation and secret directives used to
evade the spread of unfavorable news belies the “transparent” and
“politically accountable” narrative built to justify presidential control over
the administrative state.
The differences between the Reagan era—in which modern presidential
control theory was conceived—and the apparent pushback of the current age
may partially be explained by a shift away from an obsession with markets
and “voodoo economics” of the past. The public now has reason to distrust
markets, and market speak may not be as compelling of an analogy as it once
was. If true, this would be a dramatic change from the market theology of
the Reagan era that Rodgers described in Age of Fracture. The modern
critiques on Presidential Administration might be an indication that
academics are once again tweaking their models in search of Vermeule’s
“critical mass of acceptance”; while Rodgers’’ discussion illustrates the
permeability between the public’s aggregate state of mind and the debates of
academics and government officials. Modern economic anxiety may have
made the American public weary of unilateral and potentially arbitrary
decision making—which may be reflected in the contemporary legal
debates.
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Conclusion
Though unilateral presidential control may expedite the decision
making process and “efficiency” of agencies, political accountability cannot
justify presidential directives, or arbitrary policy changes and decision
making of agencies. Having a careful and thoughtful government is a good
thing. A deliberative process cannot, by its nature, be quick and easy.
Efficiency cannot be the measuring stick of reasoned consideration.
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